Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 1

Page 1 of 24 · Preview

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 2

Page 2 of 24 · Preview

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 3

Page 3 of 24 · Preview

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 4

Page 4 of 24 · Preview

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 5

Page 5 of 24 · Preview

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders — page 6

🛡

You have reached the preview limit

The free preview includes the first 6 pages of 24. Download the original document to read the full content.

⬇ Download document

Page 6 of 24 · End of preview

The full document has 24 pages. Downloads happen on the original source site.

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders

Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank

🛡CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGOPermitted use with attribution

pages: 24
Format: PDF
Size: 142.4 KB
Views: 3
Downloads: 1

↗Will open at the source site: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

Source: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository ↗ · Report an issue

Shared byKiran Ghosh›

Abstract

What affects a country's decision of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly related to its exporting interests? This article empirically examines determinants of affected country participation decisions in formal trade litigation arising under the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 2000. It investigates determinants of nonparticipation and examines whether the incentives generated by the system's rules and procedures discourage active engagement in dispute settlement by developing country members in particular. Though the size of exports at stake is found to be an important economic determinant affecting the decision to participate in challenges to a WTO-inconsistent policy, the evidence also shows that measures of a country's retaliatory and legal capacity as well as its international political economy relationships matter. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of an implicit 'institutional bias' generated by the system's rules and incentives that particularly affects developing economy participation in dispute settlement.

Related documents

Doing Business Economy Profile 2012

Doing Business Regional Profile 2016

Doing Business Economy Profile 2016

Thailand Monthly Economic Monitor, October 2025

Solomon Islands : Health Financing Options

Myanmar Report on Observance of Standards and Codes